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Summary 
‘Mutual recognition’ has featured prominently in the debate over the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU. This paper examines the different ways in which this term is 
used. It considers how mutual recognition has been used in practice, within the EU, 
between the EU and non-EU countries and between non-EU countries. 
Mutual recognition of rules involves two countries recognising each other’s standards as 
equivalent. They may have different rules but these achieve the same outcomes. These 
rules are generally managed by shared processes or institutions. This is very different to 
mutual recognition of conformity assessments which is a much more limited concept. 
Mutual recognition of conformity assessments acknowledges the differences between 
regulatory regimes but permits one party to test and certify that a product complies with 
the other party’s regulations.  
It is worth noting that mutual recognition as used in the Single Market is different to 
mutual recognition agreements between the EU and non-EU countries. Where rules are 
not harmonised at EU level, EU Member States must recognise each other’s regulations 
except where the specific and narrow derogations laid down in the Treaties, legislation 
and Court of Justice case law apply. Within the EU, the principle of mutual recognition is 
that once a product is lawfully placed on the market in one Member State, it can be 
marketed in another Member State without barriers (subject to some limited exceptions).  
The EU has already indicated that it would reject a partnership with the UK based on 
mutual recognition outside the Single Market and its enforcement mechanisms. M Barnier 
has stated that the idea of mutual recognition, in which the UK and EU would agree 
common regulatory outcomes but have the freedom to set their own rules, would not 
work: “In the absence of a common discipline, in the absence of EU law that can override 
national law, in the absence of common supervision and a common court, there can be 
no mutual recognition of standards.”1 
Outside the EU, mutual recognition is generally much more limited in scope than 
arrangements within the EU. Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) can be arranged 
without or alongside wider free trade agreements (FTAs). Australia, Israel, New Zealand 
and the US have MRAs with the EU, without a wider FTA.2 Canada, Japan and South 
Korea have MRAs within the context of their respective FTAs.3 Beyond the specific 
principle of mutual recognition within the EU itself, and to a lesser extent the Trans-
Tasman arrangement between Australia and New Zealand, most mutual recognition 
agreements are limited to conformity testing (e.g. with the US) which as noted above, is 
much more limited than mutual recognition within the EU.   
Where there is so-called ‘mutual’ recognition of standards themselves, the alignment is in 
fact based on EU rules (e.g. with Israel, Ukraine, Turkey). This category covers countries in 
the EU neighbourhood, effectively extending the territory of the internal market. This may 
explain why the Government’s Brexit White Paper proposes a “common rulebook” for 
trade in goods. 
                                                                                             
1  ‘Theresa May aims to calm Brussels fears with key Brexit speech’, Financial Times¸ 2 March 2018 
2  The EU currently has five sectoral deals with Australia and New Zealand, but opened negotiations for a 
wider free trade agreement on 22 May; ‘EU ministers greenlight Australia-New Zealand trade talks’, 
Financial Times, 22 May 2018; European Commission, Launching trade negotiations with Australia and 
New Zealand, 2017  
3  Institute for Public Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future partnership between 
the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018, p13 
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1. Introduction 
Whatever form it takes, the UK’s future customs relationship with the 
EU will address only tariffs and rules of origin. Non-tariff barriers and 
the degree of regulatory alignment or divergence are a much larger part 
of the picture and a more significant challenge.  
This paper first explains the terminology of harmonisation and mutual 
recognition. Secondly it outlines the respective positions of the UK and 
the EU on the future relationship. The third section lays out different 
mutual recognition models with examples: within the EU itself; between 
the EU and third countries; and elsewhere in the world, for example the 
Trans-Tasman Agreement. Finally it identifies the conditions for and 
limitations of mutual recognition, and the challenges for a sector-by-
sector approach. These models give some indication of how to address 
divergence in rules and standards, albeit on a more limited scale to that 
needed in the UK-EU future relationship.  
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2. Terminology 
There are different bases for mutual recognition.4  
x Mutual recognition of rules involves two countries recognising 
each other’s standards or regulatory regimes as equivalent. Their 
rules may look different but achieve the same regulatory 
objectives and/or outcomes. These rules are typically ‘managed’ 
by shared processes or institutions. According to Dr Lorand 
Bartels’ evidence to the International Trade Committee: “In terms 
of the strict logic, the way out of harmonisation and the way to 
greater flexibility is mutual recognition of standards”.5  
x Mutual recognition of conformity assessment: A much more 
limited form of recognition, acknowledging the differences in two 
different regulatory regimes but permitting one party to test and 
certify that a product complies with the other parties’ 
regulations.6 A country can test an exporter’s product to ensure 
it meets the importing country’s regulations, reducing duplication 
of some procedures.  
x Equivalence: Not mutual recognition, but better termed ‘reciprocal 
unilateral recognition’, equivalence means that one side 
recognises the other’s standards or regulatory regimes as being 
‘equivalent’ to its own, or that they are ‘adequate’ to be 
recognised. This is a unilateral decision by the importing country 
that can be withdrawn at any time.  
These categories are discussed further below, with specific examples. 
Figure 1: Scale of alignment 
 
Source: CBI Smooth Operations report, 11 April 2018 p107 
                                                                                             
4  See Institute for Government, Trade After Brexit: Options for the UK’s relationship 
with the EU, 18 December 2017 p22; KNG Shaffer and K Nicolaidis, Transnational 
Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government, IILJ NYU Law 
School Working Paper 2005/6, p8. 
5   International Trade Committee, Implications of arrangements for Ireland-Northern 
Ireland border for wider UK Trade Policy, 13 December 2017, HC 665i, Q50 
6  Institute for Government, Mutual recognition: can the UK have its Brexit cake and 
eat it?, 1 September 2017; International Trade Committee, UK-US Trade Relations, 1 
May 2018, HC481, para 41 
7  As discussed above, the definition of ‘harmonisation’ in this figure is not universal. 
The two different forms of mutual recognition appear at different positions in this 
ladder. 
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Figure 2: Options in relation to the Single Market 
 
Source: IPPR The Shared Market: A new proposal for a future partnership between the 
UK and the EU, 18 December 2017, p8  
Again, this shows a mutual recognition agreement at the bottom of the 
scale. Some mutual recognition on conformity assessment is also 
possible in a wider free trade agreement (the Canada model), and 
mutual recognition of rules or standards would be possible in an 
alignment model (transition; EEA), but this would include overall 
institutional architecture to enforce it. 
Partial membership does not exist in practice but the IPPR includes it to 
cover all possible models. 
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3. UK and EU positions 
3.1 Introduction 
The green text in the draft withdrawal agreement of 19 March 
(together with the update published on 19 June 2018)8 represents what 
the UK and the EU have agreed so far.  The House of Lords report, UK-
EU Relations after Brexit includes a table outlining the positions of the 
UK Government, the European Council and the European Parliament.9  
3.2 UK position 
The UK Government’s position is essentially to have the right to diverge, 
especially in services but to remain aligned through the ‘common 
rulebook’ for goods. 
The UK Government’s position, at least for trade in goods, appears to 
have evolved with more emphasis now on the ‘common rule book’, as 
set out in the White Paper, and less on the mutual recognition approach 
of earlier statements such as the Mansion House speech. 
Mansion House speech 
In her Mansion House speech on the future economic partnership,10 the 
Prime Minister stated that UK and EU regulatory standards will remain in 
practice “substantially similar” for trade in goods. She referred to “a 
comprehensive system of mutual recognition", where the UK “will need 
to make a strong commitment that its regulatory standards will remain 
as high as the EU’s.” The PM acknowledged that divergence (“not 
achiev[ing] the same outcomes as EU law”) might lead to a 
corresponding loss of access to the EU market.  
The speech did not specify which sectors would be prioritised in the 
negotiation, where divergence might be beneficial and therefore where 
market access might be lost. It also did not specify how particular 
objectives would be achieved. Interestingly, at Mansion House the PM 
did not explicitly refer to the ‘3 basket approach’ proposed on previous 
occasions, which has so far been rejected by the EU. This approach 
would leave open the possibility of different degrees of participation in 
different sectors: (a) sectors in and remaining aligned to the EU (b) 
sectors completely out and different rules, but mutual access 
maintained e.g. fisheries, (c) where the UK could diverge to achieve the 
same regulatory goals or outcomes by different means but the EU could 
correspondingly restrict market access in these areas (‘managed 
divergence’). Variations of this approach were proposed by the Institute 
for Public Policy Research and the Institute for Government.11  
                                                                                             
8  Joint Statement from the negotiators of the European Union and the Government of 
the United Kingdom, 19 June 2018 
9  House of Lords EU Committee, UK-EU relations after Brexit, 8 June 2018, HL 149 
10  Prime Minister’s Speech on our future economic partnership with the European 
Union, 2 March 2018 
11  Institute for Public Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future 
partnership between the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018; Institute for 
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David Davis evidence to Select Committees 
The then Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, David Davis, told the 
Lords EU Committee in January that the aim is for an overarching trade 
relationship, not a sector by sector deal. Regarding tariffs, he saw no 
reason for separate discussions e.g. on chemicals, automotive, 
electronics, given that all trade in goods should attract zero tariffs 
(explicitly offered by the EU12). However, there would be sector by 
sector issues concerning mutual recognition of both standards and 
inspection. For example, agriculture, fisheries and financial services 
would have to be dealt with separately by “mutual regulatory 
equivalence”.13 As noted above, ‘equivalence’ normally rests upon 
unilateral recognition which can be withdrawn.  
David Davis also told the Commons Exiting the EU Committee that “we 
will seek outcome equivalence in many areas, but not harmonisation”.14 
“Alignment … isn’t having exactly the same rules. It is sometimes 
having mutually recognised rules, mutually recognised inspection – that 
is what we are aiming at.”15 This interpretation of alignment differs 
from the EU’s understanding, which generally means harmonised rules 
based on those of the EU. 
The CBI survey ‘Smooth Operations’ found that in 18 of the 23 sectors 
surveyed, companies favoured close convergence. Alignment is 
particularly important for aviation, aerospace and chemicals. Sectors 
where opportunities for regulatory divergence or rule changes may have 
some limited benefits include shipping, waste and environmental 
services, water, tourism and agriculture.16 
The UK wants to stay in EU standard-setting organisations CEN and 
CENELEC17, currently open to EU and EEA members only, and is seeking 
continued membership of EU agencies, specifically the European 
Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency and the European 
Aviation Safety Agency.18 As some agencies, including the EMA, 
currently do not allow third country membership, their statutes would 
need to be changed. 
  
                                                                                             
Government, Trade After Brexit: Options for the UK’s relationship with the EU, 18 
December 2017 
12  Michel Barnier, Speech, Hanover, 23 April 2018 
13  House of Lords European Union Committee, Scrutiny of Brexit negotiations, 29 
January 2019, Q12 
14  Exiting the EU Committee, The progress of the UK’s negotiations on EU withdrawal, 
24 January 2018, HC 372, Q702 
15  ‘David Davis promises no special Brexit status for N Ireland’, Financial Times, 5 
December 2017  
16  CBI, Smooth Operations, 11 April 2018 
17  ‘UK to apply to stay in European standards system after Brexit’, Financial Times, 11 
June 2018 
18  HM Government, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, Cm 9593, July 2018, p16 
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Box 1: The White Paper 
The UK Government published a White Paper on Brexit in July 2018.19 This set out the Government’s 
proposals for the UK’s future trading relations with the EU. One of the main proposals was the 
establishment of a free trade area in goods between the UK and the EU. This aimed to ensure 
“continued frictionless access at the border to each other’s markets for goods”20 and would be based 
on a ‘common rulebook’. The White Paper said that the economic partnership with the EU would 
include: 
a common rulebook for goods including agri-food, covering only those rules necessary to provide 
for frictionless trade at the border – meaning that the UK would make an upfront choice to 
commit by treaty to ongoing harmonisation with the relevant EU rules, with all those rules 
legislated for by Parliament or the devolved legislatures21 
This would include the UK and EU continuing to recognise each other’s type approval authorities i.e. 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment. The White Paper gives the example of mutual recognition 
of Vehicle Type Approvals.22 
The UK Government’s proposal would: 
enable products to only undergo one set of approvals and authorisations in either market, before 
being sold in both.23 
The emphasis on a common rulebook is closer to the harmonisation approach to the Single Market 
(where Member States rules are aligned by legislation) as opposed to the mutual recognition 
approach.24  
Having said that, the White Paper does refer to “mutual recognition”. For example:  
To fulfil the aims set out in this paper across the economic and security partnerships, the UK 
should continue to participate in certain EU bodies and agencies. UK participation would be 
important for different reasons, but could relate to enabling mutual recognition of standards, 
sharing essential expertise and personnel, and exchanging data and information.25 
The White Paper includes proposals for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications to allow 
professionals to offer services in both the UK and the EU.26 The White Paper said: 
The UK agrees with the position set out in the European Council’s March 2018 Guidelines, which 
stated that the future partnership should include ambitious provisions on the recognition of 
professional qualifications. This is particularly relevant for the healthcare, education and 
veterinary/agri-food sectors in the context of North-South cooperation between Northern Ireland 
and Ireland.27 
The UK’s proposal would: 
x be broad in scope, covering the same range of professions as the Mutual Recognition of 
Qualifications Directive;  
x include those operating either on a permanent or temporary basis across borders;  
x be predictable and proportionate, enabling professionals to demonstrate that they meet the 
necessary requirements, or to undertake legitimate compensatory measures where there is a 
significant difference between qualifications or training, in a timely way; and  
 
                                                                                             
19  HM Government, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, Cm 9593, July 2018 
20  P7 
21  P8 
22  P21 
23  P7 
24  The Brexit White Paper on future relations and alternative proposals, Commons 
Library Briefing Paper 8387 (see page 13) 
25  HM Government, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, Cm 9593, July 2018, para 36, p92 
26  Para 49 
27  Para 54 
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x provide transparency, with cooperation between regulators to facilitate the exchange of 
information about breaches of professional standards, and to review changes to professional 
qualifications over time.28 
 
 
3.3 EU position  
Central features of the EU’s position are that there should be no cherry 
picking of individual sectors to preserve the integrity of the internal 
market and the four freedoms, and that a non-member should not 
receive the same benefits as a Member State. The future relationship 
agreement should be underpinned by enforcement and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. This institutional framework is a central 
concern for the EU. The Commission has insisted that substantive 
mutual recognition of product rules themselves is not available outside 
the internal market and its regulatory infrastructure including the 
European Court of Justice.  
Reflecting the European Commission’s trade guidelines of 7 March 
2018,29 M Barnier’s speech in Hanover set out the intention for an 
ambitious and wide-ranging free trade agreement even within the UK’s 
red lines.30 In terms of mutual recognition this would include a 
“framework for voluntary regulatory cooperation to encourage 
convergence of rules”, and provisions on movement of people and 
related areas such as coordination of social security and the recognition 
of professional qualifications. On data the EU would take ‘adequacy’ 
decisions, where the level of protection in the UK is deemed equivalent 
to that of the EU. (The UK is seeking an enhanced version of 
equivalence with supportive mechanisms, discussed below.) These 
elements are conditional on a strong level playing field, meaning 
common ground on competition and state aid, social and environmental 
standards, and guarantees against tax dumping. Such ‘non-regression’ 
clauses are also found in the EU’s trade agreements e.g. with Japan.  
Box 2: EU’s future relationship guidelines31  
Draft Article 12 on the level playing field 
“Given the UK's geographic proximity and economic interdependence with the EU27, the future 
relationship will only deliver in a mutually satisfactory way if it includes robust guarantees which ensure 
a level playing field. The aim should be to prevent unfair competitive advantage that the UK could enjoy 
through undercutting of levels of protection with respect to, inter alia, competition and state aid, tax, 
social, environment and regulatory measures and practices”. 
 
                                                                                             
28  Para 55 
29  European Commission, Guidelines, 7 March 2018  
30  Michel Barnier, Speech, Hanover, 23 April 2018 
31  European Council 22-23 March 2018 largely adopting the European Commission’s 
trade guidelines of 7 March   
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The European Parliament supports an association agreement between 
the UK and EU.32 This would be adopted under Article 217 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which provides for 
“an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
action and special procedure”. Switzerland’s sectoral agreements are 
not formally described as an association agreement but are adopted on 
the legal basis of Article 217.33 
In the UK-EU agreement, trade would be one of four chapters, together 
with internal security, external security and defence, and other 
programmes such as education and culture, R&D cooperation (e.g. 
Erasmus, Horizon). This structure also reflects the Commission’s 
approach, as confirmed in Barnier’s evidence to the Lords EU 
Committee34 and the diagram below. The political text on future 
partnership to be annexed to the withdrawal agreement could comprise 
heads of agreement for the sectors involved and the plan for each 
within the trade chapter.35  
  
                                                                                             
32  European Parliament resolution on the framework of the future EU-UK 
relationship,14 March 2018 
33  Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart, 2015) pp. 381-382 
34  House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: scrutiny of negotiations, 21 February 2018, 
Q2 
35  Guy Verhofstadt oral evidence to House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: scrutiny of 
negotiations, 20 February 2018  House of Lords EU committee, 21 February 2018, 
Q6 (p13) 
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Figure 3: EU/UK possible framework for the future partnership 
 
Source: European Commission, April 2018 
 
No cherry picking?  
The EU has consistently insisted that the four freedoms of the Single 
Market are indivisible and that there can be no ‘cherry picking’ through 
participation based on a sector-by-sector approach, that would 
undermine the integrity and proper functioning of the Single Market.36 
However, the approach for the trade chapter outlined by the EU shows 
that there is a difference between excluding sectors altogether and 
differentiated treatment between sectors. The latter could be agreed in 
the context of the overall governance framework. 
The EU itself asks for the possibility of sectoral approaches. In the 
guidelines on the future relationship, within trade in goods the EU has 
specifically identified that it is seeking existing reciprocal access to 
fishing waters and resources.37 It has also been claimed that the level 
playing field in certain policy areas is a form of the EU cherry picking.38 
In her Mansion House speech, the PM challenged the EU’s line: “The 
fact is that every free trade agreement has varying market access 
depending on the respective interests of the countries involved. If this is 
cherry-picking, then every trade arrangement is cherry-picking.”  
Clause 12 of the European Parliament resolution rules out the possibility 
of a sector-by-sector approach for a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA), although the DCFTA established in the 
association agreement with Ukraine can be seen as an example of 
‘cherry-picking’ sectors of the internal market (including goods, services 
and capital but excluding labour).39 In addition, even within services the 
DCFTA with Ukraine includes the possibility of full participation in the 
                                                                                             
36  European Council guidelines adopted 23 March 2018, para 7 
37  European Council guidelines as above, para 8(i) 
38  Brexit: new guidelines on the framework for future EU-UK relations, Commons 
Library Briefing Paper, 19 April 2018, section 8.4 
39  Institute for Government, Association Agreements, 22 March 2018  
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internal market for particular sectors including financial services, 
telecommunications, postal and courier services, and international 
maritime services. 40 The requirement for this is full compliance with EU 
legislation in those sectors, “creating the conditions for aligning key 
sectors of the Ukrainian economy to EU standards”.41  
On services, the EU’s position is that companies from the other party 
will have the right of establishment and market access to provide 
services under host state rules.42 This means that UK firms would have 
to comply with EU Member State regulations and vice versa when 
operating in each other’s markets. Specifically on financial services, M 
Barnier has said: “Where allowed by our legislation, we will be able to 
consider some of the United Kingdom's rules as equivalent using a 
proportionate and risk-based approach, in particular for financial 
stability, which will remain our main concern.”43 This equivalence-based 
approach was reiterated by Barnier and by the EU Commissioner for 
financial regulation, Valdis Dombrovskis, in late April 2018.44  
                                                                                             
40  Institute for Public Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future 
partnership between the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018, p16; ‘Two working 
examples of access to single market’ [letter from Michael Emerson], Financial Times, 
23 November 2017  
41  European External Action Service, EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area  
42  Michel Barnier, Speech, Hanover, 23 April 2018 
43  ‘EU may treat some UK financial rules as equivalent after Brexit – Barnier’, Reuters, 9 
January 2018 
44  ‘Michel Barnier quashes UK hopes of special access to EU markets’, Financial Times, 
26 April 2018; ‘EU damps hopes of bespoke post-Brexit financial deal for UK’, 
Financial Times, 25 April 2018  
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4. Different mutual recognition 
models 
4.1 Introduction 
It is important to distinguish the principle of mutual recognition in the 
Single Market from mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) between the 
EU and third countries, as these categories have quite different features. 
The European Commission has further categorised mutual recognition 
agreements with third countries in two ways: as ‘traditional’ 
agreements, meaning those that cover conformity assessment only, and 
‘enhanced’ agreements relating to standards themselves, of which there 
are two types: those based on equivalent rules, and those based on 
common rules.45 Equivalent rules can be governed either by treaty, or by 
parties screening each other’s legislation (e.g. some sectors of the 
Switzerland agreement; the marine equipment agreement between the 
EU and US, which is based on the rules of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) of which both are members; the more recent South 
Korea FTA). ‘Common rules’ are in fact EU rules involving the adoption 
by the non-EU party of the acquis communautaire (the EU’s body of 
law) as a basis for its own legislation e.g. Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs) with 
countries such as Israel, and Protocols to the Europe Agreements on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (PECAs) 
with candidate countries who hope to join the EU. An enhanced 
equivalence agreement of the kind the UK is aiming for in financial 
services, for example, does not fit obviously into these existing EU 
categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                             
45  See e.g. European Commission Staff Working Paper, Priorities for bilateral/regional 
trade related activities in the field of mutual recognition agreements for industrial 
products and related technical dialogue SEC (2004) 1072 25 August 2004. The 
paper also mentions ‘other possible measures’ such as recognition of voluntary 
labelling schemes. 
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Figure 4: EU categorisation of mutual recognition 
 
Source: author’s diagram based on information from European Commission staff 
working paper on priorities for mutual recognition agreements (2004)46 
4.2 Within the EU 
Where there are harmonised rules, EU and non-EU operators must 
comply with them in the internal market. Speaking at the London 
School of Economics, Stefaan De Rynck, senior advisor to Michel 
Barnier, said: “The EU has moved away in the wake of the financial 
crisis from mutual recognition of national standards to a centralised 
approach with a single EU rule book and common enforcement 
structures and single supervisory structures.”47  
The principle of mutual recognition applies only to products not covered 
by rules which have been harmonised, so accounts for approximately 
25%48 of products on the EU market. As a third country, the UK could 
still benefit from the EU principle of mutual recognition by placing a 
good on one Member State’s market, which would could then be sold 
in the other Member States (subject to the limited derogations discussed 
below).  
The basic principle of mutual recognition in EU law provides that if a 
product or service is lawfully placed on the market in one Member State 
of the EU/EEA, it can be marketed in another Member State without 
barriers. The principle was established by the Court of Justice in the 
                                                                                             
46  European Commission Staff Working Paper, Priorities for bilateral/regional trade 
related activities in the field of mutual recognition agreements for industrial products 
and related technical dialogue SEC (2004) 1072 25 August 2004 
47  ‘EU Brexit adviser deals blow to Theresa May’s free-trade proposal’,  Guardian, 6 
March 2018 reporting De Rynck’s talk at LSE, 5 March 2018 
48  European Commission, Evaluation of the Application of the mutual recognition 
principle in the field of goods, June 2015, p31 
Within the Single Market  
Mutual recognition 
agreements with 3rd countries  
Traditional –  
conformity assessment only  
Enhanced - standards 
Based on equivalent rules e.g. aligning 
to international level; monitoring each 
other’s incoming domestic legislation 
(further afield) 
Based on common – i.e. EU – rules 
(usually EU neighbourhood) 
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1979 Cassis de Dijon case (120/78), which concerned a German import 
ban on the French liqueur. 
Permissible exceptions to refusing recognition of products from another 
Member State are laid down in the Treaty itself and in case law. 
Concerning goods, Article 36 TFEU does allow restrictions on trade 
where justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; 
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property. Where a rule applies to both imported and national goods, 
further justifications based on ‘mandatory requirements’ are available. 
The Cassis de Dijon case mentions factors such as effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer. This is a non-exhaustive 
list e.g. road safety was added in C-110/05 Commission v Italy which 
concerned a ban on the use of moped trailers.  
In services, a ban on cold calling potential customers deprived the firm 
Alpine of a “rapid and direct technique for marketing and for 
contacting potential clients in another Member State”, but in this case it 
was justified and proportionate in the public interest on grounds of 
consumer protection (C-384/93 Alpine Investments). 
Member State measures must be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim 
and proportionate i.e. if other less trade-restrictive measures are 
available to achieve that aim then the justification will not be accepted. 
National derogations can be seen as an opportunity to diverge even 
within the internal market. However, they must be justified on a strictly 
case-by-case basis according to the facts, and these derogations from 
free movement are only allowed in the context of the institutional 
‘ecosystem’ (this term from the EU27 regulatory issues slides) of the EU. 
Professor Stephen Weatherill argues that “Primary EU law does not 
dictate that if products are good enough for one Member State, then 
they are good enough for all Member States. Instead it demands only 
that the more fastidious State shall demonstrate why they are not good 
enough for it.”49 
Mutual recognition within the internal market is also governed by 
legislation. The current Mutual Recognition Regulation 764/2008 
defines the rights and obligations for public authorities and for firms 
that wish to market their products in another EU country. It requires 
public authorities to give written notice of trade-restricting action to the 
European Commission and traders and gives a time limited right to reply 
(Art 6). This Regulation is in the process of being amended50 and going 
through the EU legislative process (see European Scrutiny Committee 
                                                                                             
49  S Weatherill, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition: It Doesn’t Work Because It 
Doesn’t Exist’ (2017), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 43/2017 
50  December 2017 legislative proposal COM(2017)796 – new Regulation on mutual 
recognition of goods lawfully marketed in another Member State (to replace the 
Mutual Recognition Regulation 764/2008)  
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29th report, 23 May 2018: Mutual recognition of goods) as part of the 
Goods Package51 on improving the principle of mutual recognition. 
The new Regulation proposes: 
x a new simple voluntary mutual recognition declaration to show 
that a product is already on the market in another Member State 
and that it meets requirements there, to prevent different 
requirements for proof in different Member States (Lord Henley, 
BEIS responsible Minister, is particularly supportive of this in the 
Explanatory Memorandum on the Regulation, according to the 
European Scrutiny Committee report) 
x a ‘single market clause’ in national technical regulations to the 
effect that goods marketed in another Member State are 
presumed to be compatible with the national measure. This clause 
also applies to Turkey as a party to the customs union.  
x strengthening product national contact points and the problem-
solving mechanism through SOLVIT. SOLVIT aims to address 
obstacles faced by EU citizens or business in another country in 
cases where a public authority is not meeting its obligations under 
EU law. The SOLVIT centre in the home State liaises with the 
SOLVIT centre in the country where the problem occurred.52 
The Single Market Transparency Directive 2015/1535 also aims to 
prevent barriers for products which are not or only partially harmonised. 
Member States are required to notify any draft regulations concerning 
these products to the European Commission at least three months 
before their proposed adoption (the ‘standstill’ period). 
If agreement can be reached, these types of mechanisms could be 
instructive for the future UK-EU relationship.  
4.3 Arrangements between the EU and third 
countries 
Mutual recognition agreements can be arranged without or alongside 
wider free trade agreements. Australia, Israel, New Zealand and the US 
have MRAs with the EU, without a wider free trade agreement.53 
Canada, Japan and South Korea have mutual recognition agreements 
within the context of their respective FTAs.54 The EU’s free trade 
agreements typically include mutual recognition provisions on technical 
barriers to trade (TBT), which do not require harmonisation of 
standards; on sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS), where 
measures may be regarded as mutually equivalent; and on narrower 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications only for particular 
                                                                                             
51  European Commission Communication COM (2017) 787 The Goods Package: 
Reinforcing trust in the single market  
52  European Commission SOLVIT homepage. Examples of problems solved here 
53  The EU currently has five sectoral deals with Australia and New Zealand, but opened 
negotiations for a wider free trade agreement on 22 May; EU ministers greenlight 
Australia-New Zealand trade talks’, Financial Times, 22 May 2018; European 
Commission, Launching trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, 2017  
54  Institute for Public Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future 
partnership between the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018, p13 
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regulated occupations. 55 These agreements tend to relate to goods only. 
Where mutual recognition agreements work on a sector-by-sector basis, 
the number of sectors covered is narrow, and many have not been fully 
functional in practice.56  
The European Commission laid out its future priorities based on lessons 
drawn from the EU’s existing MRAs in a 2004 paper,57 which continues 
to reflect its current view. The Commission concluded that MRAs 
covering conformity assessment only, without alignment of regulatory 
standards, have “proven difficult to negotiate and even more difficult to 
implement. It is not worth pursuing new negotiations on this type of 
MRA.”58 In existing MRAs not based on equivalence of rules, it 
suggested deepening rather than broadening in terms of sectors: 
“efforts should concentrate on the management of sectors that operate 
satisfactorily and the simplification of procedures.”59 It recommended 
that future agreements should be founded on “clear equivalence of 
respective rules and a real prospect of making them operate almost 
‘automatically’”.60  
Conformity assessment – ‘traditional’ 
Conformity assessment implies no alignment on standards themselves, 
and the regulatory requirements of the two parties may differ 
substantially.61 This type of overall MRA, with sectoral annexes covering 
a small number of sectors, has been concluded with the US, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. There is also mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment bodies in particular sectors in the 
wider framework of particular FTAs: for example, vehicle type approvals 
by third country authorities are recognised through the EU-South Korea 
FTA and the agreements with Switzerland. 
  
                                                                                             
55  Institute for Public Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future 
partnership between the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018, p12 
56  E Lydgate & A Winters (2017) Deep and not comprehensive? What the WTO rules 
permit for a UK-EU trade agreement, University of Sussex Economics Working Paper 
Series 12-1017, p13; Correia de Brito, Kauffmann & Pelkmans (2016), ‘The 
contribution of mutual recognition to international regulatory co-operation’, OECD 
Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 2, p80 
57  European Commission Staff Working Paper, Priorities for bilateral/regional trade 
related activities in the field of mutual recognition agreements for industrial products 
and related technical dialogue SEC (2004) 1072, 25 August 2004 
58  As above, p3 
59  As above, executive summary, p2 
60  As above, executive summary, p2 
61  See OECD (2016), p67 
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Box 3: Sectoral annexes for certain regulated sectors in the EU’s FTAs – no single 
market treatment (from EU27 regulatory issues slides, February 2018)62 
Cars, Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP63), Chemicals, Wines and Spirits, Consumer 
Electronics 
 
- promote compatibility and convergence of regulations based on international standards and enhance 
regulatory cooperation 
- avoid undue delays for regulatory and administrative market access procedures 
- avoid unnecessary duplication of testing/certification requirements/audits 
- facilitate trade by recognising GMP certificates/inspections/labels 
- prevent the creation of new barriers which could nullify benefits of the FTA 
- limited recognition of home requirements as equivalent to EU requirements 
 
Canada 
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with 
Canada is much more limited than the regulatory recognition of the EU 
Single Market.64 A Protocol to CETA provides a framework for Canada’s 
testing bodies to certify that goods made in Canada meet European 
standards, and vice versa, but there is no mutual recognition of the 
actual standards. Individual agreements would need to be agreed 
according to sector depending on the specific regulations for the 
particular product. In some areas Canada has agreed to follow EU rules 
without reciprocation, and with no influence in how the EU sets those 
rules. 65 
The CBI’s Smooth Operations report explains that “because the EU and 
Canada have different laws, to sell products both in the EU and Canada 
businesses on both sides must – in the main – comply with two sets of 
rules, get products cleared by two sets of regulators, pay for two sets of 
licences and in some instances, even pay for the authorities on the other 
side to randomly inspect their products before goods can cross the 
border.”66  
CETA’s provisions on financial services are considered below. 
Switzerland 
The agreement with Switzerland is a hybrid agreement. Part of the 
framework of MRAs with Switzerland is ‘traditional’ in that it covers 
only conformity assessment, whereas other parts are ‘enhanced’ based 
                                                                                             
62  EU27 regulatory issues slides, 21 February 2018, slide 23 
63  Good Manufacturing Practices are designed to ensure consistent minimum quality 
standards and minimise risks in production which cannot be eliminated by testing 
the final product. They often test conformity to guidelines recommended by 
licensing agencies in a particular sector e.g. covering food and drink, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals, dietary supplements and medical devices. Good Manufacturing 
Practices are also included in the EU-US MRA regarding pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, and in the ACAA with Israel. 
64  Stephen Woolcock, What a CETA (or CETA+) free trade agreement would mean, LSE 
Brexit blog, 9 March 2018   
65  Exiting the EU Committee, The future UK-EU relationship, 4 April 2018, HC 935, 
para 22 
66  CBI, Smooth Operations, 11 April 2018, p11 
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on equivalent rules, depending on the sector.67 In its review of MRAs, 
the Commission notes that “Switzerland is probably a unique case. A 
European, highly developed economy with infrastructure equivalent to 
that of the EU and with strong incentive to align its rules with those of 
the EU, its main trading partner.”68 In that sense it is in a similar position 
to the UK.  However, the EU has stated it is not keen on a Swiss-style 
agreement and is currently negotiating stronger governance 
arrangements. This includes an independent arbitration panel with 
issues of EU law referred to the EU Court of Justice, and the ability for 
Swiss laws to be changed automatically in line with EU law. 69 
The EU-Swiss agreement includes a chapter on motor vehicles providing 
for mutual recognition of vehicle type approvals. Where legislation is 
deemed equivalent, EU type approvals will be recognised as proving 
conformity with Swiss legislation, and vice versa.70 
Box 4: Trade with Switzerland in industrial goods (from EU27 regulatory issues slides, 
February 201871)  
x Specific historical context: convergence towards EU/EEA 
 
x t.VUVBM3FDPHOJUJPO"HSFFNFOUJOSFMBUJPOUPDPOGPSNJUZBTTFTTNFOU 
 
ņ Where equivalence of substantive rules is granted, it is assessed by the EU based on Swiss 
full alignment with relevant acquis (horizontal [framework] legislation + vertical [sectoral] 
legislation) 
ņ -20 sectoral chapters listing relevant EU and Swiss legislation: 
ņ 15 New Approach sectors (CE marking legislation, e.g. electrical equipment, 
machinery, toys, gas appliances, etc.) 
ņ  5 additional sectors: motor vehicles, agricultural and forestry tractors 
Good Laboratory Practice for the testing of chemicals, Good Manufacturing Practice for 
pharmaceuticals, biocidal products 
Products compliant with Swiss aligned legislation covered by MRA equivalence provisions accepted in 
the EU as compliant with corresponding EU legislation (and vice versa) 
x -Unsatisfactory governance: no provisions on dynamic alignment and preservation of role of 
CJEU 
x -Heavy maintenance required: static agreement, each change in relevant EU acquis requires new 
EU equivalence assessment of amended Swiss legislation by EU side and decision by MRA 
governing body amending relevant sectorial chapters 
x -No waiving of border controls & no free movement clause beyond specific MRA scope 
 
  
                                                                                             
67  European Commission Staff Working Paper, Priorities for bilateral/regional trade 
related activities in the field of mutual recognition agreements for industrial products 
and related technical dialogue SEC (2004) 1072, 25 August 2004, p4 
68  As above, p5 
69  ‘Swiss soften line on foreign judges in bid to bolster EU ties’, Financial Times, 5 
March 2018 
70  HM Government, Automotive Sector report, December 2017, para 64-65 
71  EU27 regulatory issues slides, 21 February 2018, slides 26-27 
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South Korea  
In the EU-South Korea FTA both sides have committed to providing full 
market access by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
In addition to the automotive sector discussed below in ‘equivalent 
rules’, other sectors of the FTA include mutual recognition tools to 
tackle non-tariff barriers in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and electronics: 
ņ Pharmaceuticals – inform each other of laws, regulations 
etc. such laws to take into account international rules, 
practices, guidelines  
ņ Chemicals – public health & environmental measures, best 
practice and regulatory mechanisms 
ņ Electronics - agreement to recognise international standard-
setting bodies (but no working group as with automotive, 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals) 
The FTA sets up a Committee on Trade in Goods that shall meet at the 
request of either party. This Committee can consider broadening the 
scope of non-tariff barrier disciplines, speeding up liberalisation as well 
as tackling other issues related to trade in goods between South Korea 
and the EU.72  
US 
The 1998 EU-US Agreement was the first MRA to cover multiple 
sectors.73 Figure 5 shows the structure of the EU-US agreement and the 
mechanisms in each sector. However, again the agreement only relates 
to conformity assessment and the range of coverage is quite narrow. 
There are only 6 sectors - telecoms equipment, electromagnetic 
compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals - of which 2 are currently operational.74 In this respect 
the MRA is aspirational rather than fully implemented. Initially 11 areas 
were being negotiated.75 The MRA also has a transatlantic structure for 
overseeing implementation.76 
  
                                                                                             
72  European Commission, EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement: a quick reading 
guide, October 2010  
73  OECD (2016), p73 
74  See European Commission, Mutual Recognition Agreements. The pharma 
agreement was concluded in 2017 after 20 years, but will not fully come into force 
in 2019, and scope of medicines covered may not be finalised until 2022. 
75  International Trade Committee, UK-US relations, 25 October 2017, HC 481-i, 
Shanker Singham oral evidence 
76  International Trade Committee, UK-US Trade Relations, 1 May 2018, HC481, para 
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Figure 5: Structure of the EU-US MRA 
Framework 
 Preamble, emphasising market access, encouraging harmonisation and 
equivalent assurance 
 Specifying definitions (e.g. ‘designations’) 
 Specifies conditions by which each party will accept or recognize results 
of Conformity Assessment Procedures 
 Transition periods (confidence building) 
 Designation and listing procedures 
 Suspension rules of Conformity Assessment Bodies 
 Conditions for withdrawals 
 Monitoring of Conformity Assessment Bodies 
 Exchange of information and contact points 
 Joint committee (plus sectoral ones) 
 Preservation of regulatory authority 
 Provisions for suspension of recognition obligations  
Sectoral annexes 
 
Telecoms Equipment  
Operational since 2000 
Specification of laws and 
requirements; CAPs; listing of 
authorities; designation; 
subcontracting; transitional 
arrangement: 24 months. 
Electro-Magnetic Compatibility 
(EMC) 
Operational since 2000 
Similar setup as for telecoms 
equipment 
 
Electrical Safety 
Not operational 
Similar setup as for telecoms 
equipment; cross-linkages to 
telecoms and EMC. In EU, lab 
assessments completed under US 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) procedures 
(EU can do on-site visits in the US). 
Recreational Crafts  
Operational 2000-2006 only 
Specification of laws and 
requirements; scope and 
coverage; designating authorities; 
CAPs; transition of 18 months; link 
with EMC and electrical safety.  
Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP)  
Not operational 
 
Pre and post approval inspections; 3 
year transition 
period; equivalence determination at 
end of 3 years; nature of recognition 
of inspection reports; transmission of 
reports; suspension; joint sectoral 
committee; safeguard clause; 
appendix with applicable laws; 
criteria for equivalence in that 
appendix  
Medical devices 
Not operational 
Scope different in EU and US; 
product coverage (quality evaluation 
systems; product evaluation; post-
market vigilance reports); 3 year 
transition period; other aspects 
similar to pharma GMP; alert systems 
 
Source: adapted from OECD (2016), p. 76 
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There are also separate agreements between the EU and the US. The 
recent agreement on prudential measures in insurance and reinsurance 
services allows recognition even though rules are not identical.77  
The EU-US MRA on marine equipment was agreed in 2004. Going 
beyond conformity assessment, it is an ‘enhanced’ MRA that involves 
harmonisation based on the international rules of the International 
Maritime Organisation. This is an early example of the European 
Commission’s current policy towards MRAs.  
Common rules 
According to Correia Brito et al’s comprehensive study for the OECD, 
apart from the EU context covering the internal market and agreements 
where third countries adopt EU rules for access to it, the only other 
mutual recognition arrangement based on common rules is the Trans-
Tasman Agreement between Australia and New Zealand.78 
Agreements based on common rules relate to the EU’s neighbourhood. 
While these agreements look like ‘mutual’ recognition agreements, they 
are really facilitating the extension of the trade territory and rules of the 
EU internal market. Examples of these are Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs) concluded 
with Israel, and the Protocols to the Europe Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (PECAs), concluded 
with candidate countries for EU membership.  
Goods in a given sector certified for acceptance on the home market of 
one party are automatically accepted on the market of the other party 
with no further testing or checks, as if between EU Member States. This 
requires the use of identical technical standards and testing 
procedures.79 The Commission’s view is that “Such agreements can only 
be concluded with countries where there is a political commitment for 
extension of the internal market to them, which de facto requires them 
adopting the acquis communautaire.”80 
Switzerland  
As mentioned above, the relationship with Switzerland is a hybrid one 
with a network of different agreements. In goods, Switzerland and the 
EU have a Free Trade Agreement preventing tariffs and quotas for 
industrial products, together with agreements to reduce tariffs on 
agricultural and processed agricultural products. Alongside this there is 
                                                                                             
77  International Trade Committee, UK-US relations, 25 October 2017, HC 481-i, 
Shanker Singham oral evidence, Council of the European Union, Bilateral Agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on prudential 
measures regarding insurance and reinsurance, 23 May 2017, European 
Commission, Fact Sheet – EU–US agreement on insurance and reinsurance, 22 
September 2017 
78  Correia de Brito, Kauffmann & Pelkmans (2016), ‘The contribution of mutual 
recognition to international regulatory co-operation’, OECD Regulatory Policy 
Working Paper No. 2 
79  ‘Two working examples of access to single market’ [letter from Michael Emerson], 
Financial Times, 23 November 2017 
80  European Commission Staff Working Paper, Priorities for bilateral/regional trade 
related activities in the field of mutual recognition agreements for industrial products 
and related technical dialogue SEC (2004) 1072, 25 August 2004, p5 
24 Future trade with the EU: Mutual recognition 
an ‘enhanced’ Mutual Recognition Agreement to reduce technical 
barriers to trade.81  
Although the EU-Swiss MRA is the widest and most ambitious in the 
world82, in practice this ‘mutual’ recognition is applied asymmetrically. It 
involves ensuring that “standards testing bodies in Switzerland are able 
to say whether something meets EU standards, and then that good can 
just be shipped across the border…This is largely a process whereby the 
[underlying] EU standards and rules in goods have been adopted by 
Switzerland and then they can be sold in the EU… The Swiss accept 
products from the EU on the Cassis de Dijon principle mechanism, but 
the EU does not recognise the Cassis de Dijon towards Swiss 
products.”83 Switzerland has accepted this principle to make it easier to 
import products made in the EU/EEA, but it is not reciprocated for Swiss 
exports. 
Turkey 
The Customs Union between the EU and Turkey entered into force at 
the end of 1995. It covers all industrial goods but excludes agriculture 
(except processed agricultural products), services and public 
procurement. Bilateral trade concessions apply to agricultural as well as 
coal and steel products. In addition to providing for a common external 
tariff for the products covered, the Customs Union requires Turkey to 
align to the acquis communautaire in several essential internal market 
areas, particularly with regard to industrial standards. 84 
When the EU concludes a trade agreement with a third country Turkey 
is required to take on the obligations of that agreement but has to 
negotiate its own benefits and access to that country’s market. 
Alongside its membership of the customs union, Turkey also aligns with 
the EU’s chemicals regime under REACH as part of an agreement to 
reduce Technical Barriers to Trade. 
The examples of Turkey and Switzerland illustrate that where MRAs are 
based on ‘common’ rules, those rules are in fact EU rules. These 
agreements require “adoption of the acquis communautaire (legislation, 
case law, decisions) by the other party as a basis for its own 
legislation”.85 This is also the case with the technical standards on which 
conformity testing is based in the ACAAs and PECAs. In the ACAA with 
Israel, for example, the EU is not recognising Israeli rules, so in that 
sense there is no ‘mutual’ recognition or ‘equivalence’.86 Sussex 
                                                                                             
81  Institute for Public Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future 
partnership between the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018, p14 
82  OECD 2016, p66 
83  Exiting the EU Committee, The future UK-EU relationship, 4 April 2018, HC 935, 
paras 66 and 68. Exiting the EU Committee, The progress of the UK’s negotiations 
on EU withdrawal, 6 February 2018, HC 372, Q921 and Q923; Institute for Public 
Policy Research, The shared market: A new proposal for a future partnership 
between the UK and the EU, 18 December 2018, p15 
84  European Commission, Turkey  
85  European Commission Staff Working Paper, Priorities for bilateral/regional trade 
related activities in the field of mutual recognition agreements for industrial products 
and related technical dialogue SEC (2004) 1072, 25 August 2004, p5 
86  ‘Brussels’ reach encourages others to harmonise product rules’ [letter from Edmond 
McGovern], Financial Times, 28 November 2017  
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University’s UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) noted in written 
evidence to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Select 
Committee’s Brexit inquiry that “A basic requirement for an ACAA 
[Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial 
Products] is legislative alignment.” As the European Scrutiny Committee 
report summary indicates, Swiss MRA(s) and ACAAs are better termed 
market integration agreements as they require unilateral alignment with 
EU legislation. 
Box 5: Article 3: Alignment of legislation87 
For the purpose of this Protocol, Israel agrees to take appropriate measures, in consultation with the 
European Commission, to align with and maintain relevant EU law as it applies to the placing on the 
market of products covered by this Protocol. 
 
In sectors covered by this Protocol where relevant EU law is based upon the use of technical standards 
giving presumption of conformity with essential safety requirements (known as "New Approach" 
sectors) Israel agrees to take appropriate measures, in consultation with the European Commission, to 
align with and maintain relevant EU practice in the fields of standardisation, metrology, accreditation, 
conformity assessment, market surveillance, general safety of products, and producers’ liability. "New 
Approach" sectors are indicated as such in the Sectoral Annexes. 
 
 
Equivalent rules 
Equivalence decisions are based on an assessment of the results of 
regulatory regimes, rather than similarities in regulation.88 As the 
International Trade Committee’s report puts it, in cases of equivalence, 
one country recognises that the regulations of a third country in a 
specific area achieve the same regulatory outcomes even if they do not 
follow the exact same specifications as the recognising country’s laws. 
As a result, if a product is compliant there, it need not go through extra 
checks and certification for compliance.89 
However, equivalence usually refers to a unilateral assessment by one 
party. Insofar as it is ‘mutual’, equivalence is better viewed as a network 
of unilateral decisions, or reciprocal unilateral recognition. Equivalence 
or minimum ‘adequacy’ is used by the EU towards third countries in 
data protection, financial services and airline security.  
In the EU’s current trade relations, equivalent rules can be determined 
by reference to an international treaty where both parties agree to 
follow those rules, or by the parties screening each other’s planned 
legislation. This occurs e.g. in some sectors of the EU-Switzerland 
agreement; and in the marine equipment agreement with the US, which 
                                                                                             
87  2013/1/EU: Council Decision of 20 November 2012 on the conclusion of a Protocol 
to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of 
Israel, of the other part, on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial 
Products (CAA)  
88  Institute for Government, UK-EU regulation after Brexit: options for equivalence, 21 
November 2017 
89  International Trade Committee, UK-US Trade Relations, 1 May 2018, HC481, para 
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is based on the rules of the International Maritime Organisation of 
which both are members. More recently, the EU-South Korea FTA 
makes reference to United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) harmonisation in the automotive sector. 
Box 6: Equivalent rules in the automotive sector  
EU-South Korea FTA (2011): includes a provision on the mutual recognition of vehicle type approvals. A 
type approval issued by one party’s competent authority, confirming conformity with the relevant UN 
ECE Regulations, must be accepted by the other party as providing proof of conformity.  
The basis for this is both parties’ commitment to aligning their own regulations to World Forum for 
Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) UNECE [United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe] regulations or Global Tech regulations within five years.   
Compliance with these commitments is monitored by a working group also established under the FTA.  
Korea has agreed to accept ‘EURO VI’ certificates for heavy duty commercial vehicles, and simplified 
electronic documentary procedures for imports of E-marked tyres. 
 
Voluntary information exchanges and cooperation on upcoming 
regulatory measures are also used at agency level, for example between 
the European Medicines Agency and the US Food and Drug 
Administration on pharmaceuticals. 
The screening of intended future legislation is especially relevant in the 
EU-UK context since the parties are starting from shared rules. 
Financial services 
Box 7: EU draft guidelines on trade and the future relationship: Annex 4 financial 
services 
"Regarding financial services, the aim should be reviewed and improved equivalence mechanisms, 
allowing appropriate access to financial services markets, while preserving financial stability, the 
integrity of the single market and the autonomy of decision making in the European Union. Equivalence 
mechanisms and decisions remain defined and implemented on a unilateral basis by the European 
Union." 
 
‘Improved equivalence’ in the EU’s draft above appears to relate to the 
institutional mechanisms which would underpin the agreement (as 
opposed to allowing a greater scope for substantive divergence). 
The Chancellor’s 7 March HSBC speech90 challenged the European 
Commission’s assertion that financial services cannot be part of a free 
trade agreement. He recognised that a future economic partnership 
“will always need to ensure a fair balance of the rights and obligations 
associated with market access”. 
He noted the aim of delivering an equivalent outcome by different 
means, but that the EU’s established third-country equivalence regime 
would be inadequate. Instead a principle of “mutual recognition and 
reciprocal regulatory equivalence” is needed, provided it is objectively 
                                                                                             
90  Chancellor's Speech on financial services, HSBC, 7 March 2018; see also 
Chancellor’s evidence to European Scrutiny Committee, EU Withdrawal, 5 March 
2018, HC 763  
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assessed, with proper governance structures, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and sensible notice periods to market participants. 
This would include maintaining a structured regulatory dialogue to 
discuss new rules proposed by either side and an objective process to 
determine whether they provide sufficiently equivalent regulatory 
outcomes including not only the rules themselves, but also an 
assessment of the way in which they are enforced. 
Hammond acknowledged consequences for choosing not to maintain 
equivalent outcomes but that these should be reasonable and 
proportionate, predictable and decided by an independent arbitration 
mechanism. For this he raised the example of the governance 
mechanism already in CETA (rather than CETA-style provisions on 
standards which do not go far enough).91 
According to the FT, under a ‘dynamic reciprocal mutual recognition 
model’ [this phrase is a quote from an anonymous source] “the UK 
would commit to keeping its financial regulations in line with EU rules, 
and would cede authority to a dispute resolution mechanism to 
calibrate the City’s market access or impose other conditions — for 
example higher capital requirements — if one side was seen to be 
breaking the spirit of the agreement”.92 
The White Paper said that the Government was aiming for: 
new economic and regulatory arrangements for financial services, 
preserving the mutual benefits of integrated markets and 
protecting financial stability while respecting the right of the UK 
and the EU to control access to their own markets – noting that 
these arrangements will not replicate the EU’s passporting 
regimes;93 
The White Paper proposed a “new economic and regulatory 
arrangement” for financial services. This would build on the EU’s 
existing equivalence arrangements. These new arrangements “would be 
based on the principle of autonomy for each party over decisions 
regarding access to its market.”94 They would include provisions on 
governance, supervisory co-operation and regulatory dialogue. The 
White Paper accepted that continuing with passporting would not be 
compatible with leaving the Single Market.  
The Chancellor described the White Paper’s proposal as “less than 
mutual recognition, but … more than the EU’s equivalence regime.” He 
said it was “a model that preserves the stability, transparency and 
certainty of the former, while respecting the sovereignty of the latter.”95 
The Institute for Government commented that these proposals “would 
                                                                                             
91  See also ‘UK aims to keep financial rules close to EU after Brexit’, Financial Times, 16 
February 2018  
92  As above 
93  HM Government, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, Cm 9593, July 2018, para 8 
94  Para 64, page 30 
95  Philip Hammond, ‘A new approach for UK financial services after Brexit, Financial 
Times, 12 July 2018 
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require the EU to show a lot of flexibility.”96 The UK has pointed to the 
TTIP negotiations for an example of enhanced financial services 
equivalence: outcome-based assessment of whether the other side’s 
regime was equivalent, underpinned by a binding appeal system that 
would enable either side to automatically gain equivalence if they were 
found to have been unfairly denied. This goes beyond the EU’s current 
conception of the ‘equivalent rules’ model. 
According to the Centre for European Reform, the EU tabled informal 
proposals on regulatory co-operation in financial services during the 
fifth round of the TTIP negotiations. In its non-paper the EU proposed a 
process that could eventually lead to ‘mutual reliance’ of regulations 
and future rules, although mutual reliance was not fully defined. 
However, other sections of the non-paper clarified that any party may 
rescind equivalence decisions unilaterally, but should consult 
beforehand.97 
The wording on mutual recognition of standards was ultimately 
dropped in the TTIP negotiations. As an alternative, the parties agreed 
to establish a softer US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue 
(FMRD).98  
Box 8: Insurance: pre-emptive equivalence 
In the Solvency II legislation harmonising insurance regulation on how insurers are funded and 
governed, the EU granted equivalence to several third countries pre-emptively before the relevant EU 
directive came into effect.  Switzerland, Bermuda and the US are deemed to have fully or partially 
equivalent rules. Open Europe advocates the UK seeking this ‘pre-emptive equivalence’ approach.   
 
The recent EU-US agreement on prudential measures in insurance and 
reinsurance services allows recognition even though rules are not 
identical.99 
Data 
Similarly to financial services, the UK wants a solution that goes further 
than unilateral ‘adequacy’ decisions in data protection based on Art 45 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).100 Adequacy decisions allow 
the Commission to recognise that a third country provides data 
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protection standards that are ‘essentially equivalent’ to those applied in 
the EU, allowing for the free flow of personal data.101  
In evidence to the Exiting the EU Committee on 9 May, data experts 
concurred that the UK should seek a stand-alone data agreement, 
separate from a trade agreement, in an international Treaty. This would 
take account of the fundamental rights element of data protection and 
would give a further layer of protection.102 
Services  
The EU has stated that access to services will be on the basis of host 
State rules.  
CETA provisions (without any pluses…) fall short of passporting and do 
not go far beyond WTO terms, according to the Institute for 
Government.103 CETA does include some provision for trade in services, 
including access to the Canadian markets in telecoms, energy and 
maritime transport sectors, and enables EU companies to bid for public 
procurement contracts in Canada. The EU has agreed to open up its 
services markets using the ‘negative list’ approach meaning that all 
services markets are liberalised except those explicitly excluded.104 
However, the EU entered a large number of reservations on Canadian 
access to EU financial markets. The agreement focuses on access 
according to host State rules, and there is nothing about equivalence.105 
The Exiting the EU Committee concluded that a trade agreement 
making up for the loss in services coverage the UK currently enjoys as 
part of the Single Market “would require an unprecedented 
development of mutual recognition agreements far more ambitious 
than any previously agreed by the EU with a third country.”106 
Explaining the barriers to the EU-UK relationship simply ‘cloning’ the 
mutual recognition practices on services from the Single Market, Fredrik 
Erixon told the Exiting the EU Committee that there will be differences 
between sectors depending on the degree of EU regulation and the 
need for a licence approval.107  
The Most Favoured Nation clause in CETA with Canada and other 
agreements means that if the EU offered broader or more generous 
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services coverage to the UK then it would be obliged to offer similar 
improved terms to its existing trading partners. Clifford Chance 
suggested it might be possible for the EU and the UK to have a mutual 
recognition agreement on financial services with an underlying 
requirement that the UK and EU regulators would perform in a 
particular way. Another nation wishing to take advantage of the MFN 
clause would also need to conform to those mutual recognition 
requirements. In this way, it would open up a renegotiation for the EU 
but it would not be an automatic opening up of the same benefit.108 
4.4 Mutual recognition arrangements 
elsewhere in the world 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement 
(TTMRA) 
The Trans-Tasman arrangement only involves two countries – Australia 
and New Zealand – as compared to the EU28 (currently) and the EFTA 
countries within the EEA. The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition 
Agreement (TTMRA) is inspired by the Cassis de Dijon principle in EU 
case law – goods lawfully marketed in one territory can be marketed in 
another, and goods only need to comply with regulations and standards 
in the country where they were produced. The Trans-Tasman 
Agreement works on a presumption that there is mutual recognition 
unless otherwise stated. However, there is a lengthy negative list in an 
annex setting out goods or sectors where the agreement does not 
apply.109 In evidence to the Exiting the EU Committee, Dr Lorand Bartels 
stated that “…[the Australia and New Zealand] agreement has many 
more carve-outs than what one sees in the EU.”110 The Institute for 
Government points out that within the TTMRA highly regulated sectors 
are exempt from the mutual recognition provisions, and there is no 
extensive provision for services.111 
It only applies to a limited range of goods (and not to services). Highly 
regulated sectors, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are largely 
excluded. 
According to the Institute for Government, both governments have a 
much more relaxed approach to regulation than the EU tends to show. 
In the TTMRA, the equivalence of regulatory objectives is assumed to be 
valid, unless there is a specific clause stating otherwise. In this respect, it 
differs from the situation in the EU’s internal market, where Member 
States must justify any restriction of trade based on derogations in the 
Treaty and case law, and those lawful restrictions must also be 
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proportionate (see Weatherill in the section on mutual recognition 
within the internal market above).  
The TTMRA works by treating New Zealand as a de facto Australian 
state government, sitting in the Council of Australian Governments 
when regulations are discussed. There are also shared agencies in some 
sectors, such as food safety and banking supervision. In some areas it 
goes beyond mutual recognition to harmonisation.112  
Replicating that option, with the UK as a ‘28th State’, would give the UK 
a greater say after Brexit than the EEA members or Switzerland, which is 
unlikely to be accepted.113 Although in the transition agreement there is 
provision for the UK to attend meetings affecting its interests, a TTMRA-
style mechanism would go much further.  
The agreement can be revoked by either side for up to one year. This is 
longer than the period the EU has proposed in the UK-EU withdrawal 
agreement for suspending the UK’s market benefits if it infringes EU law 
during the transition period.  
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5. Challenges to a sectoral 
approach 
There are a number of challenges to this sectoral approach, aside from 
the EU’s objections to cherry-picking, including: 
 how to choose sectors, with different priorities in the EU27.114  
 the interconnectedness of rules: how many and which rules 
should be adhered to e.g. in the case of car standards, there are 
ancillary and related rules such as emissions, State aid, working 
conditions etc. Sectors could however be identified with 
reference to their legal basis (i.e. Treaty article).  
 as outlined in the CBI Smooth Operations report, the need to 
avoid the temptation of a simple sectoral approach and instead 
examine the UK and EU’s ties rule by rule; changes to rules for 
one sector will not just affect businesses in that sector. 115   
 how to solve disputes: objective determination of whether a 
competitive advantage has been gained is very difficult  
The shift to the common rulebook approach in the White Paper reflects 
previous assessments, such as by the Institute for Government, that an 
agreement with the UK based on broad mutual recognition is highly 
unlikely. Its absence of oversight and institutions would contradict the 
EU’s approach to trade:116 a “comprehensive mutual recognition of rules 
… would be completely unprecedented and require a massive change 
of approach by the EU.”117 In addition, a ‘managed divergence’ system 
along the lines of the IfG and IPPR proposals is unlikely to gain traction 
among the remaining Member States. Instead, Andrew Duff suggests 
that a DCFTA between the UK and EU should be agreed, supplemented 
with a system of sector by sector mutual recognition agreements.118  
Professor Piet Eeckhout’s study on trade relations for the European 
Parliament’s International Trade Committee finds that an intermediate 
model, which would allow for continued convergence and mutual 
recognition in some sectors/freedoms, but not others, is unavailable and 
cannot easily be constructed for legal, institutional, and political 
reasons.  The stark choice is between a customs union/free trade 
agreement, or continued internal market membership through the EEA 
or an equivalent agreement.119 In a University College London blog post 
based on that study, he further argues that irreconcilable market 
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integration versus trade liberalisation paradigms mean “it is difficult to 
imagine a relationship that would allow for continued convergence and 
mutual recognition in some sectors, or for some of the basic freedoms, 
but not others”.120 In common with Duff, Eeckhout believes that a 
DCFTA with system of mutual recognition is the most likely model. 
However, this would be one-way alignment i.e. the UK with the EU. 
Pascal Lamy, former EU Trade Commissioner and Director General of 
the WTO, told the Exiting the EU Committee: “Mutual recognition... is a 
very specific way of ensuring, provisionally, with a certain fragility, 
regulatory convergence”121 … “there are nice words about best efforts 
to co-operate in standardisation of spare parts of cars or chemical 
ingredients, but the legal constraint is very weak and totally different 
from what it is in the internal market”.122 
This fragility is echoed by Professor Gareth Davies, who argues that 
mutual recognition has a “self-destructive quality which gives it a short 
shelf life”.123 (This is largely because mutual recognition tends to create 
the conditions for harmonised rules. Conversely, in the current situation 
the UK and the EU are heading in the opposite direction.) 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations 
suggest that mutual recognition of testing and certification is much 
harder to do than anticipated. Proposals were then scaled down to 
focus on mechanisms for approximation of future legislation.124 (For 
example, similar to the measures in the EU-South Korea FTA)  
A further legal issue is compatibility with WTO rules. WTO rules state 
that customs unions or free trade agreements must liberalise 
“substantially all the trade” in goods (Art XXIV:8b GATT) or have 
“substantial sectoral coverage” for trade in services (Art V:1(a) GATS). 
Narrow sectoral agreements that did not cover “substantially all the 
trade” between the UK and EU would be vulnerable to challenge by 
other WTO members. This implies that sectoral arrangements would 
need to be made in the context of a broader agreement.125 
There is no settled definition of ‘substantially all’ trade in goods in the 
WTO’s rulings.126 In services, ‘substantial’ means “in terms of number of 
sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply… Agreements 
should not provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply.” 
(Art V:1(a) GATS). In reality, as Pascal Lamy told the Exiting the EU 
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Committee, agreements should be notified to the WTO to be vetted by 
committee, but there are many waiting in line and control is ‘shallow’, 
so that agreements are unlikely to be blocked.127 The UKTPO has also 
pointed out that these provisions have never been fully enforced.128 
WTO rules exclude arrangements whereby UK-EU trade in a few specific 
sectors would receive more favourable terms than those offered to 
other WTO members. For example, the arrangement which the UK 
government reached with Nissan would not be WTO-consistent if it 
included tariff concessions. This principle is made clear in the 2000 
Canada – Autos dispute.129 It would be possible according to WTO rules 
to sign an agreement labelled a Free Trade Agreement, but within 
which the rules of origin were applied in such a way that for some 
products no tariffs were applied regardless of origin.130 
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6. Conclusion  
Sectoral arrangements are unlikely to be accepted by the EU without 
overarching governance structures. This could be done by an overall 
association agreement in the form of a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA), supported by mutual recognition 
agreements in individual sectors. These are likely to be on the basis of 
Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial 
Products (ACAAs) aligning to EU rules.  
Where UK and EU rules are not aligned, regulatory equivalence (same 
objectives, different means) could be achieved by voluntary agreement. 
This could be done by reference to international rules where relevant, or 
by monitoring each other’s incoming legislation and standards. This 
would need to be supported by a mechanism to mediate disputes and 
govern the circumstances in which recognition could be withdrawn.  
The dynamic for sectoral agreements in the negotiations may be partly 
influenced by who will have chief negotiator responsibility for the future 
relationship on the EU side. This role could fall to a special negotiator 
(similar to M Barnier’s position in the withdrawal negotiations), the 
incoming EU Trade Commissioner, or the Commission’s Directorates 
General in separate policy areas. 
The European Scrutiny Committee’s report on mutual recognition in 
goods concludes that “The contradiction between the Government's 
vision of mutual recognition and the nature of the EU's regulatory union 
suggests that there is not much middle ground: the Government is likely 
to find itself faced with a choice between a standard Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (though perhaps more comprehensive in the 
range of sectors covered) or a market integration agreement which 
involves accepting EU rules.” The Brexit White paper suggests the 
Government has opted for the latter, at least as far as trade in goods is 
concerned. 
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